In this paper we evaluate the relative influence of external versus domestic inflation drivers in the 12 new European Union (EU) member countries. Our empirical analysis is based on the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) derived in Galí and Monacelli (2005) for small open economies (SOE). Employing the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), we find that the SOE NKPC is well supported in the new EU member states. We also find that the inflation process is dominated by domestic variables in the larger countries of our sample, whereas external variables are mostly relevant in the smaller countries.
Introduction
This paper provides the first comprehensive empirical evidence on inflation dynamics in the new European Union member countries (NEUMCs), an issue with important and immediate policy implications. To forecast inflation and manage inflation expectations and to achieve (implicit) inflation targets central banks need to understand the inflation process. While this is valid everywhere in the world, the 10 former centrally-planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the 2 Mediterranean island-states forming up the NEUMCs pose a particular challenge. This is so because of the limited availability and quality of the data for this group of economies.
We estimate the small open economy New Keynesian Phillips Curve (SOE NKPC) based on the model by Galí and Monacelli (2005) to characterize inflation dynamics in the 12 NEUMCs.
We choose this particular model because all countries in our sample can be classified as small open economies where external inflation drivers are potentially important. Thus, our primary goal in this paper is to disentangle and evaluate the relative influence of external versus domestic inflation drivers.
We have collected and constructed our own data set from various official sources, trying to ensure maximum length and methodological consistency for all 12 NEUMCs. For each of the 12 NEUMCs we estimate different specifications of the SOE NKPC by the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). We find that the SOE NKPC performs reasonably well for nearly all NEUMCs. Our results indicate that the inflation process in four of the larger countries tends to be dominated by domestic variables, while in five of the smaller ones it is mostly affected by external variables.
Only few papers analyze inflation dynamics in the Central and Eastern European countries.
Using the Generalized Dynamic Factor Model (GDFM) due to Forni, Hallin, Lippi and Reichlin The paper is further organized as follows. Section 2 outlines our empirical strategy, presenting the theory-derived equation we estimated and the data set. Section 3 reports and discusses our results, while the last section concludes the paper.
Empirical Strategy and Data
Our analysis is based on the model described in Galí and Monacelli (2005) . From there, the CPI inflation rate, , in a small open economy can be shown to follow
whereˆ denotes marginal production cost (in deviation from steady state), is the (natural) log of the effective terms of trade of the SOE vis-à-vis the rest of the world, is the standard time discount factor, and ∈ [0, 1] is the share of imported goods in the household consumption bundle and, thus, a measure of trade openness.
Sinceˆ can be shown to be proportional to the SOE's output gap, , the NKPC for the SOE can alternatively also be expressed as
where
furthermore, is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption and is an analogous parameter characterizing the intertemporal labor/leisure choice, is related to the degree of price stickiness (as 1 − is the probability of adjusting prices in a Calvo (1983) setting), measures the substitutability between goods produced abroad, and > 0 is the intratemporal substitutability in consumption between the SOE's domestically-produced and imported goods.
Equation ( This pressure is stronger the higher is the degree of openness to trade, . Inversely, an expected deterioration of the ToT in the next relative to the current period (Δ < Δ +1 ) would lower current-period demand for domestic goods as agents expect their relative price to decline in the future, and thus exerts downward pressure on current inflation.
Our empirical analysis is based on GMM estimation of equation (2) . Note that the terms of trade enter explicitly in the equation along with domestic drivers of CPI inflation. Therefore this equation is a natural starting point for a comparison of domestic and external factors relevant for inflation dynamics.
Due to limited data availability, we had to create our own quarterly data set, which underlies the estimation results in this paper. We combine information from different organizations that compile international and national time series in a regular and more or less harmonized fashion, such as the IMF (International Financial Statistics), 1 OECD (National Accounts), 2 Eurostat (National Accounts) and the national statistical offices of the new EU member countries. Detailed definitions and sources of the NEUMCs time series we employed are provided in Appendix A. In this section we briefly summarize this information and compare the available data proxies across the countries in our sample.
[ Tables 1 and 2 about here]
As can be seen from Table 1 , our samples by country are in most cases of the order of about 50 quarterly observations, starting from the first quarter of 1995 for most countries. In the case of the post-socialist transition economies, 1995 is a good beginning of the sample because any earlier one would have meant much more turbulence carried over from the highly volatile five years of initial reforms that implemented a huge structural change across these economies, invalidating econometric inference. In most countries this transitional excessive variability in institutions and in the economy had settled down by the mid-1990s, also with view to the envisaged EU accession and the preparatory work toward it. For comparability (and sometimes also data availability) reasons, it is not surprising that we opt for the same initial quarter in the case of the two non-ex-socialitst economies, Cyprus and Malta. Because of the hyperinflationary episode in January-February 1997 that led to the currency board regime in Bulgaria in operation since July 1997, we prefer to start our sample later, in fact from the first quarter of 2000 (due to better-quality GDP series). As for Romania, consistent data for the 1990s are not available (in particular, export and import price measures), so we were constrained to begin this country's sample in the first quarter of 2000 too.
We have separated on purpose our total sample of 12 small open economies into subgroups of countries that appear more similar with one another. This grouping reveals the logic we followed in the non-alphabetical ordering of the NEUMCs when reporting and discussing our estimates further down, identical to that in Table 1 . Poland and Hungary started the reforms earlier than the other post-socialist countries; the Czech Republic and Slovakia were one country that split apart in 1993; Slovenia is the only member of former Yugoslavia, and is also the most advanced transition economy in terms of level of GDP per capita and standard of living; the three Baltic countries share similar historical and regional economic characteristics; likewise do Bulgaria and Romania, which were the 'laggards' in the ex-socialist group in terms of progress with the market and institutional pre-accession reforms; and, finally, Cyprus and Malta are small
Mediterranean islands that were never socialist countries but were both colonies of the United Kingdom until quite recently. This grouping, we hope, may help our analysis and interpretation of the empirical results.
The largest difficulty in ensuring consistent data came from the proxies for the price indices of exports and imports (summarized in Table 2 ) needed to define the terms of trade and their expected change entering the estimated regressions. Our choice of variable proxies reported in the next section has thus mostly been motivated by the longest available ToT series -i.e., often the Eurostat data, whose other advantage would be the maximum comparability (arising from the harmonized underlying methodology). Since CPI data for most countries display clear signs of seasonality, we use seasonally-adjusted (sa) CPI data for all countries in our baseline specification. Our standard method of calculating the output gap is by subtracting the HodrickPrescott (HP) filtered trend.
Estimation Results
Starting from our baseline estimates of the seasonally-adjusted (sa) CPI, Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtered output gap SOE NKPC specification in Table 3 , the overall impression is that we obtain largely plausible results. However, the reported estimate of for Hungary comes out significant at the 5% level with a negative value not allowed by theory. A similar problem occurs for the output gap coefficient, , for Romania where we also find a significant negative value. All other aspects of the regressions in Table 3 well. The output gap coefficient is statistically significant for 7 countries, although for Romania, the point estimate is negative.
[ Table 3 about here]
We checked the robustness of the reported baseline estimates by considering the same SOE NKPC version but estimated with non seasonally-adjusted (nsa) CPI data as well as an additional specification where the output gap was obtained using a quadratic polynomial (QP)
instead of the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. Our results (available upon request) indicate that the regression with nsa CPI data corrects the problem of negative estimates for Hungary and Slovenia, yet at the same time producing negative estimates for Poland, Latvia, Cyprus and the Czech Republic, and that the coefficient on the output gap comes out negative in a larger number of countries than in the baseline estimation. From this robustness check we conclude that our central results remain valid also with alternative methods of detrending and non seasonally-adjusted data, but the econometric performance of the estimations deteriorates.
[ Table 4 about here]
As a next step, we compare our baseline estimation with three alternative versions of the NKPC, which could be seen as a test of the Galí and Monacelli (2005) model against other common specifications of the NKPC. We start with an 'empirically motivated' SOE NKPC, where we essentially replace (Δ − Δ +1 ) in (2) with the first difference of the terms of trade, Δ . Estimation results are shown in Table 4 . We see that this modification of our estimated equation seriously worsens the estimates for the coefficient , of which now only 3 remain statistically significant. This result provides support in favor of the theory-consistent equation (2).
[ Table 5 about here]
We proceed by estimating the 'pure' forward-looking closed-economy NKPC version. Results are reported in Table 5 . The estimation of the pure closed-economy NKPC adds 3 countries (Estonia, Lithuania and Malta) where the output gap becomes statistically significant and positive relative to our baseline estimates of the SOE NKPC in Table 3 . Thus, this pure closed-economy specification performs quite well, with only 2 countries (Slovakia and Slovenia) where the output gap remains insignificant. However, this specification does not deliver an answer to the question whether external or domestic factors dominate inflation dynamics in the NEUMCs.
[ Table 6 about here]
We finally consider the 'hybrid' closed-economy NKPC version, whose estimates are reported in Table 6 . This specification does not improve on our baseline regression overall as it results in problematic estimates of the forward-looking parameter, , in particular for Bulgaria and
Romania. Yet it is worth noting that backward-looking behavior comes out statistically signif- countries. This is somewhat surprising given the short time series which we employed to estimate the SOE NKPC for the NEUMCs. We would suggest two explanations for this interesting finding. First, due to the process of transition there has been greater macroeconomic volatility in the NEUMCs in the last decade and a half relative to the Western countries, which may have resulted in a more significant output gap coefficient in the inflation regressions. This is confirmed by the comparison of the standard deviations of the output gap between the two groups of countries which are on average about 10% higher in the NEUMCs than in our sample of 10 OECD countries. Second, stability-oriented monetary policy in the Western countries over the last two decades has contributed to the great macroeconomic moderation (just before the current global financial crisis when our data set ends), and thereby to a decoupling of inflation from real economic activity reflected in the insignificant output gap coefficients we found. The absence of this effect in the NEUMCs has probably led to stronger output gap variations and thus to a significantly estimated effect of the output gap on inflation.
Concerning the relative importance of domestic versus external drivers of inflation dynamics, our results appear ambiguous, as shown in Figure 1 . On the one hand, it seems that mostly domestic factors influence inflation dynamics in most of these countries (9 out of 12) for the baseline estimates from the sa-HP SOE NKPC specification, which performs better than the other commonly employed NKPC versions (the empirically motivated SOE NKPC and the pure and the hybrid closed-economy ones). However, these findings do not pass convincingly the robustness check we implemented via the two (nsa-HP and nsa-QP) alternative specifications of the SOE NKPC. Generally, we may conclude that domestic determinants of inflation clearly dominate external ones in Poland, Hungary, Latvia and Bulgaria, and most likely in the Czech
Republic. On the other hand, external inflation drivers clearly dominate domestic ones in Slovakia, Lithuania and Cyprus, and most likely in Slovenia and Romania and perhaps in Estonia.
These results differ somewhat from what is reported for the 9 Western EU members in our earlier work, where external factors generally played a stronger role.
The only relevant dimension of our SOE NKPC estimates which differentiates the new EU member states appears to be their (relative) size: the inflation process in 4 of the larger countries among the NEUMCs (Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Czech Republic) tends to be dominated by domestic factors (possibly due to a higher degree of administered or otherwise influenced socially-sensitive prices), whereas 5 of the remaining smaller countries are mostly affected by external inflation drivers. Exceptions in terms of the relationship of size and dominance of external vs. domestic inflation drivers are only Latvia, which is a small country in the group of domestically-dominated inflation countries, and Romania, which is the largest country in the group of externally-dominated inflation countries.
Concluding Remarks
There are just a few studies that have assessed empirically inflation dynamics in the NEUMCs, and none of these focuses directly on the relative importance of external versus domestic determinants of inflation. However, policymakers in these countries need to understand better what type of factors influence the evolution of the price level when they forecast inflation and manage inflation expectations. It is, therefore, of immediate policy relevance to address this issue in an informed and robust way. This has exactly been the purpose of our present paper. The novelty of our approach consists in basing our main econometric regressions on the widely-used New Keynesian SOE model of Galí and Monacelli (2005) , as a way to achieve theoretical consistency of the estimated regressions. This particular SOE NKPC equation has not been estimated so far for the NEUMCs, but only for a sample of 8 Western EU economies (plus Switzerland and Canada) in an earlier paper of ours that provides an additional motivation for comparing the results across these two groups of EU members. 
B Instrumental Variables Used in the Estimations
In addition to the instruments below, each instrument set includes also a constant.
In Table 3 : In Table 4 :
As in Table 3 .
In Table 5 :
In Table 6 :
As in Table 3 , but starting with lag 2 of CPI inflation. 
